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This essay is based on our previous draft paper [9] that addressed several mind-related philosophical
questions by describing how their solutions could in principle be calculated. Since our paper showed
itself to be difficult to understand, we now verbalized more of our reasoning and restricted this essay
to a more basic question: Given functionally equivalent minds, how does the expected quantity of their
conscious experience differ across different substrates2 and how could we calculate this?
We argue that a realistic digital brain emulation would be orders of magnitude less conscious than
a real biological brain. On the other hand, a mind running on neuromorphic hardware or a quantum
computer could in principle be more conscious than than a biological brain.
2 Simulated Room Thought Experiment
Consider the following scenario: You are a broke philosopher and you meet a strange transhumanist
brain scientist. He offers you a great monetary reward for participating in his experiment that uses a
novel brain scanner. After agreeing to participate, you sign a statement that allows him to own all the
information that is obtained from the scan. He lets you enter a special room while he waits in a different
room. You notice that the room you are in only has a red door and a blue door.
You then receive a video call from the transhumanist. He explains to you that the scan was success-
fully completed and that he just used all of the detailed information about your brain cells in order to
create a quite accurate simulation of your brain that is currently being run in real-time on a powerful
supercomputer. This simulator is a complicated software that simulates membrane potentials of accurate
virtual 3-D models of your brain cells. Not just your brain, but in fact your entire body and the room are
being simulated with it.
Since you do not believe him, he then reconnects the video call such that you can talk to the simulated
version of yourself. You then converse with this simulated version of yourself for a long time, until you
are certain that the simulation is indeed functionally equivalent to yourself and has the same memories
as you. The simulated version believes itself to be real and believes that you are simulated. You disagree
and get into a long argument over this issue. Finally both of you have to concede that currently neither
one of you knows for certain, who is the original and who is the copy.
After this insight of yours, the transhumanist rejoins the video call and explains that the promised
monetary reward can be obtained by leaving through the red door; but if you leave through the blue door
you will stay broke. As you start moving towards the red door, he goes on to explain that the simulation
is set up, such that the simulated version of you will be terminated painlessly, without even noticing,
when leaving through the blue door. However, if it leaves through the red door, it will encounter a
torturous death. Since you do not really know whether you are being simulated or not, you back off
from that red door.
1Written in June of 2020.
2The substrate is the type of physical device that contains a mind. Examples of substrata are biological brains and electronic
processors or even Chinese rooms [18].
The transhumanist refuses to reveal whether you are the original or not, but he provides you with
sufficient further information, to verify his claims about the two doors. He furthermore reveals that the
torture would not be worth the money. You now have only two choices: leave through the red door or
leave through the blue door. The room is set up such that it is impossible for you to obtain any empirical
evidence that would reveal whether you are real or virtual. You now have to rely on your philosophy-
skills to make this decision.
3 Solution via Universal Prior
In this section we find out whether you are the original or the copy and take the corresponding decision.
3.1 Occam’s Razor and Minimum Description Length
The simulated room thought experiment leaves us with two explanations, two theories, or two hypothe-
ses, or two models, that both equally well explain all of the observations that you are making while
being in the room. In such cases one can try to apply one of the most fundamental principles of science
and rationality, which is most commonly known as Occam’s razor [4], although it was formulated as far
back as Aristotle [3]. It is usually translated as: ”entities should not be multiplied without necessity.” ,
which is to be interpreted to mean that given multiple conflicting theories that equally well explain all of
the observations made so far, one should choose the explanation that is the simplest, i.e.: the explanation
that contains the least assumptions, or more precisely, the smallest amount of presupposed information.
Note that the simplest theory does Not need to be the easiest one to find nor the easiest one to understand
by any means. The principle was also restated by Newton [14], Einstein, and so on.
In the electronic computer age, several formalizations of Occam’s razor were developed, collectively
referred to as minimum description length (MDL) [1, 13, 17, 19]. The general idea is to select the short-
est formal description or the shortest computer program that generates only all of the observed data,
i.e. theories correspond to programs. The length of the program is measured by its information content,
e.g.: By how many bits are required to write the program. The computer on which the program can run,
is called the reference machine, which should itself be a most simple universal computer. Note that the
shortest program’s run-time does not need to be short at all. In the following subsections we start to
apply MDL to the thought experiment.
3.2 Evidence for Digital Physics
Before moving to the solution, let us have a quick look at fundamental physics. It has been suspected for
at least 50 years that our universe is a discrete mathematical structure that in principle could be entirely
and accurately computed [21] by simple rules, that are simpler than contemporary theories consisting of
definitions of continuous functions in continuous spaces with numeric constants. Fundamental physical
limits to computation would be expected from digital physics, thus an example of evidence for digital
physics is the existence of multiple ultimate physical limits to computation [11] (computation speed,
energy requirements, memory) derived from contemporary physics. Further hints are the low-entropy
initial state that is the big bang as well as the finiteness of the observable universe. Furthermore, gen-
eral relativity can be re-derived using assumptions of digital physics [6, 12]. Hence, most recently, the
Wolfram Physics Project was launched, aimed at finding the ultimate fundamental theory of physics
that would be a program, which generates a hypergraph that is the universe [20], where the big bang is
the start of the computation. Note that, presumably, given unlimited computational resources, such a
program should generate every single Plank-scale event that ever happened in the history of our universe.
3.3 Observation and Subjective Conscious Experience
Before applying Occam’s razor, we have to specify what your observation consists of. If we were to
specify that your observation should consist only of a short verbal description of what the room looks
like from the inside, we would miss out on a lot of additional information that you are perceiving.
An alternative would be to specify your observation as consisting out of the data stream from your
sensory nerves to your brain. However, for conscious rational decision making, this data stream is only
available to you in a form that was already highly preprocessed within your brain. Furthermore this data
stream does not include observations of your own memories and thoughts. The optimal solution would
be to specify the observation as consisting of your entire subjective conscious experience and nothing
more, since we do not want to leave out any information that you may know, nor include unwarranted
assumptions about the outside. However, we can only use the aspects of your conscious experience that
are describable in principle, such as a network of similarity-relations between colors, No indescribable
aspects, such as the redness of red.
Representations of such conscious experience in the form of mathematical structures have been
proposed for example by Tononi [15] and Goertzel [5]. Without contemplating whether their represen-
tations are exactly correct, we will work under the assumption that conscious experience can in principle
be represented as a mathematical structure. This assumption becomes more plausible, if physics, at its
most fundamental level, is fully computable, since conscious experience seems to be generated from
physical events.
Unfortunately, you are unable to introspect and write down this mathematical structure, because
it consists of too much information. Nevertheless, you could still take the rational decision without
needing to analyze this mathematical structure directly, but instead, by reasoning about what you would
decide if the mathematical structure were available, and then take that same decision. Therefore, for the
remainder of this section, we can reason as if this mathematical structure were available to us. Let this
mathematical structure of your conscious experience be called Q.
3.4 Multiple Components of the Shortest Program
Following MDL, we have to find the shortest possible program that generates Q. This shortest pro-
gram represents the theory which contains the assumptions that are the most epistemically rational to
believe, when knowing nothing but Q. Therefore, by introducing commonly held modern-day assump-
tions which we believe to be rational, we can infer what the properties of this shortest program may be.
Our assumptions are the following:
Assumption 1: All physical events in the history of our universe are fully computable from a set of
rules that is much simpler than a mind.
Assumption 2: Your mind is in some way located within this history of our universe that is vastly
larger and older than your mind.
Assumption 3: The functioning of the mind is enabled by a large number of underlying physical events.
Assumption 4: The structure of conscious experience Q is a consequence of how the mind functions.
Therefore, by connecting these assumptions, we can infer that the shortest program contains the fol-
lowing components:
Component 4: Computes Q from a formal description µ of computations3 that your mind performed
according to its functional aspect (likely at neural level).
Component 3: Computes µ from the underlying fully detailed description of the physical events that
occurred in your mind (from Plank-scale).
3Note here that ’computing Q’ and the ’computations that your mind performed’ are two different computations.
Component 2: Localisation: Searches the detailed history of our universe to find the spatiotemporal
location of your mind according to simple search criteria. This component is inspired by Hutter’s ob-
server localisation [7], although he did not apply this idea to the mind.
Component 1: Computes the entire detailed history of our universe including all Planck-scale events,
starting from the big bang.
To repeat the main claim here: These are the components of the shortest possible program that can
generate the structure of your conscious experience Q. Let this program be called pmin.
Sidenote: If Q would itself consist of less information than a program consisting of such components,
than the shortest program that describes Q would obviously not consist of the described components.
This would happen if Q were the conscious experience of a small animal with very few neurons. This
implies, that given only the small animals experience Q, it would not be rational to have the above
assumptions. But since we assume the above assumptions to be rational, it implies that a human’s Q is
sufficiently large.
3.5 Comparing the two Substrates
Recall that we were left with two possibilities: Either you are the original, that inhabits the substrate
consisting of biological neurons, or you are the copy, that inhabits the substrate consisting of software
running on electronic processors. In order to choose between these two possibilities, we can compare
the length that pmin would have, if you were located on either substrate, and then select the shorter one
in accordance with Occam / MDL. We can conduct this length comparison by estimating the difference
separately for the previously introduced four components of pmin and then adding up these differences
to estimate the total difference in length, although it would be very difficult to obtain any accurate num-
bers. The following is the Comparison:
Component 4: Since the minds on the two substrates are functionally almost identical, component 4
must be almost identical for both cases and hence the expected difference in length is negligible.
Component 1: Since both substrates are located in the same universe, component 1 will be the same
(or almost the same) for both substrates, and hence the length difference will be zero.
Component 3: Recall that this component has to compute µ, where µ is a formal description of computa-
tions that your mind performed according to its functional aspect, likely at the neural level. Component
3 computes µ from the underlying fully detailed description of the physical events that occurred in your
mind. In order to accomplish this, for both, the substrate of biological neurons, as well as the substrate
of software of electronic circuits, firstly the motions of electric charges have to be recognized. The
main difference between the two substrates is the following: Recall that the simulator, running on a
supercomputer, is a complicated software that simulates membrane potentials of accurate virtual 3-D
models of your brain cells. For the original biological neural substrate, component 3 could already be
relatively close to obtaining µ, just by having recognized the motion of electric charges. Not so for
the digital substrate: After having recognized the motion of electric charges within computer circuits,
a larger amount of additional information is required in order to interpret these many binary currents
as numbers that somehow, hidden behind layers of software, represent coordinates, shapes, and electric
activities of neurons, from which µ can ultimately be obtained. This required additional information
causes a great difference between the substrates with regards to the length of component 3.
Component 2: The search criterion of the localisation would largely consist of information concerned
with recognizing whether some matter is a mind of a certain substrate. To accomplish this recognition
task, component 2 could make use of parts of component 3. But from the many recognized minds,
still the right one (yours) needs to be selected. The additional amount of information required for this
selection, only has to grow logarithmically w.r.t. the total number of minds, analogous to how the size
of identification numbers only has to grow logarithmically w.r.t. the number of objects to be identified.
Therefore, between the substrates, we can assume the length difference in component 2 to be overshad-
owed by the length difference in component 3.
If we now add up the four differences, we should get a total length difference that is mostly impacted by
component 3, which makes the length of pmin smaller in the case of the original substrate of biological
neurons. Let this total length difference be called δ. Now you could use Occam’s razor to shave away
the possibility that you are simulated.
3.6 Epicurus’ Multiple Explanations and Algorithmic Solomonoff Probability
As you are about to use Occam’s razor to shave away the possibility that you are simulated, you suddenly
remember Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations: ”If several theories are consistent with the
observed data, retain them all!”. Indeed, you only found out that one of the two possibilities is more
likely, but you have no idea how strong the odds are. The odds could be 51 to 49, in which case you
would like to choose the blue door, since the torture is not worth the money. On the other hand, the odds
could be 1000000 to 1, in which case you would like to choose the red door instead. So what is needed,
before taking the decision, is a probability estimate, which we shall introduce here.
Epicurus’ principle furthermore reminds us that there could not just be one theory supporting the
claim that you are simulated, but there could instead be many such theories and therefore, being simu-
lated could in principle be more likely, even though each one of these theories on its own is less likely.
Solomonoff took such concerns seriously and developed the Universal Prior, also known as Algorithmic
Probability [16, 19]. It is the probability distribution over all possible observations that are outputs of
a simple universal computer, given that the program was selected uniformly at random from all possi-
ble programs. This means that the Universal Prior probability is obtained by considering all, infinitely
many, possible theories simultaneously. However, remarkably, the Coding Theorem by Levin [10],
showed that this Universal Prior probability can always be estimated by 2−K , where K is the Algorith-
mic Kolmogorov Complexity [8] , that is the length (in bits) of the shortest program that outputs the
observed data. Since, in our case, a rough estimate could be sufficient, we can use this formula, which
only relies on the shortest, instead of all possible programs, thanks to the Coding Theorem.
3.7 The Odds and the Final Decision
The odds is a ratio between two probabilities. The odds we are interested in, is the ratio between the
probabilities of your two possible substrates. As shown in the previous section, such probabilities can
be estimated by 2−K , where K is the length of pmin in bits, that differs between the two substrates.
Therefore, by dividing one such probability by the other, we get the odds equal to 2δ , where δ is the
difference between the two K that we obtained in subsection 3.5.
If δ would be equal to a measly 20 bits, it would imply that you are about 220 times more likely
to be on one substrate over the other, i.e.: it would be about one million times more likely. Since
we previously concluded that the value of δ is mostly influenced by the engineered complexity of the
simulator, and you know software to usually be orders of magnitude more complex than 20 bits, you
conclude that you must be many orders of magnitude more likely to be the real, original, philosopher
consisting of biological neurons. You finally leave through the red door and happily take the money.
Luckily it was not some efficient brain emulation running on specialized neuromorphic hardware
without complex software, otherwise this decision would have been more tricky.
4 Discussion
4.1 Substrate Prior of Consciousness
If you would not know where you are, but you only knew that there are a thousand people at place A and
only ten people at place B, then you would assume that you are about a hundred times more likely to be
at place A. The total amount of consciousness at place A is also hundred times greater than at place B. It
becomes obvious that such probabilities scale with the quantities of consciousness, or, more generally,
with the expected quantities of consciousness.
In the previous section we have seen that, if you are a conscious mind, a priori, the probability
of being a certain mind can differ drastically solely based on the properties of the substrate, despite
functional equivalence. This means that we can define a prior probability distribution over substrates; let
it be called the Substrate Prior of Consciousness. Given a set of substrates, an estimate of this prior could
in principle be calculated by following the steps of the previous section. However, presently achieving
accuracy is not possible because the ultimate theory of fundamental physics remained unknown to this
day, as well as how to represent Q is unknown, as well as how exactly the human brain functions is
unknown, all of which would be required for an accurate calculation, and all of which could potentially
become known in the following decades.
This Substrate Prior of Consciousness could be interpreted as an expectation value of the quantity
of consciousness of a mind on a substrate relative to other substrates. A number that is an expectation
value of the quantity of consciousness can then be interpreted in the following two major ways:
1. This number is the probability of being conscious as opposed to being unconscious.
2. This number is the quantity of consciousness itself.
We advocate the second interpretation, since it avoids the strange case of a person that believes it-
self to be conscious but is in fact completely unconscious; a type of philosophical zombie. However
there can easily be extremely low substrate priors and therefore there can still be persons that have such
a low quantity of consciousness that we could consider them philosophical zombies in practice.
Note that this quantity of consciousness should not be confounded with the degree of wakefulness,
since the word conscious can mean ’being awake’, as opposed to ’being in deep sleep’, unconscious.
4.2 Importance for Mind Uploading and the Ethics of AI
Unfortunately, the most technologically feasible way to upload your mind into a computer would be
to have a machine repeatedly slice small pieces off your brain in order to scan them with sufficient
detail, until your brain is completely disassembled. This is called destructive mind uploading, since the
original mind is destroyed. If you were an old person with a disease that is slowly deteriorating your
mental health and your life quality, You might want to use this technology in order to continue your
life as a cyborg without the disease. Such a decision could depend on the substrate prior, since, if the
computer’s substrate prior would turn out to be very low, your electronic afterlife would be worthless
compared to your current life, which you hence would decide to retain.
Conversely, given the technology of non-destructive mind uploading, in order to complete an over-
whelming amount of annoying work, you could make numerous virtual copies of yourself and enslave
them to complete this work. The decision to do this, again, could hinge on the substrate prior, since, if
the computer’s substrate prior would turn out to be relatively high, the virtual self-enslavement could
potentially inflict great suffering on yourselves, which you therefore would want to avoid. If, on the
other hand, the computer’s substrate prior would turn out to be relatively low, you would not have to
worry about fully exploiting these virtual minds.
The same reasoning can be applied to the ethics of artificial intelligence in the question regarding
the exploitation of generally intelligent machines. Bostrom and Yudkowsky introduced the ’Principle
of Substrate Non-Discrimination’ [2], which reads: ”If two beings have the same functionality and the
same conscious experience, and differ only in the substrate of their implementation, then they have the
same moral status.” Here ”same conscious experience” should probably be replaced by ”same quantity
of conscious experience”; a condition, which, as we have seen, is not to be taken as a given.
The method presented in our essay can be applied to a wide range of other related philosophical
problems, to be revealed in future publications.
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